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Abstract 
 
Are there contemporary development effects of African resistance to European 
domination? This question is the primary issue addressed by this inquiry. We 
establish that African resistance has had adverse effects on post-colonial African 
development and discuss possible channels of such causality. This relationship is 
robust to alternative model and to controlling for the outliers.  
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 “I do not have any intention to remain an indifferent spectator, in case distant powers 
would dream of dividing Africa, as Ethiopia has been for fourteen centuries a Christian 
island in a pagan sea ...” 
Menelik, Emperor of Ethiopia in Victoria of Great Britain, 1891. Asmai (Archives del 
Ministerodegli Affari Esteri, Rome), Ethiopia Pos . 36/13 -109 Menelik to Queen 
Victoria, Addis Ababa, 14 Miazia 1883,“added piece Tarnielli to MAE, London. 
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1. Introduction 
The low growth experienced by African countries in the post-independence era up to the 
recent period of growth resurgence that began in the mid-1990s has motivated a 
substantial body of literature (see Englebert, 2000a, Jerven, 2011; Kodila-Tedika & 
Agbor, 2014). There is also an interesting stream of literature on the consequences of 
slavery and colonization on institutional and economic developments in Africa (see 
Englebert, 2000b; Bertocchi & Canova, 2002; Nunn, 2008; Richens, 2009; Nunn, 2010; 
Whatley & Gillezeau, 2011; Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011; Bezemer et al., 2014).  
The present inquiry contributes to the literature by addressing the following 
question? Are there contemporary development effects of African resistance to 
European domination? To the best of our knowledge, this question has not been 
addressed in the literature. This is essentially because the available literature devoted to 
eliciting Africa’s underdevelopment has for the most part been focused on the 
hypothesis of an African dummy of development on the one hand and on the other 
hand, technological change and social obstacles as causes of the continent’s 
backwardness (Amavilah, 2015).  
Adu Boahen (1987, 23) wrote “What is the attitude of Africans to the emergence 
of colonialism, resulting in a fundamental change in the nature of relations that had 
ceased to exist between them and the Europeans for three centuries? This is a question 
that historians, both Africans and Europeans, have not yet studied in depth, but yet it 
requires an answer which is unequivocal: an overwhelming majority, African 
governments and authorities are violently opposed to this change, express their 
determination to maintain the status quo, and above all to maintain their sovereignty and 
independence – for which practically none was willing to compromise anything”2.  
As indicated by this historian, while understanding African development 
remains fundamental, the issue has generated little interest and research. Some 
qualitative attempts of the impact of African resistance on contemporary development 
have been noted (Huillery, 2009; Frankema, 2011, 2012) but not much empirical 
investigation has been conducted.  
 Using a cross-sectional sample of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, this study 
assesses the consequences of African resistance to European domination on 
contemporary development. We take advantage of an existing series of original data on 
                                                          
2 Translated; emphasis in original.  
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African resistance by Frankema (2011, 2012). We employ an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression that enables us to establish a negative relationship between 
contemporary African development and the level of resistance in the past. Our 
investigation also extends to verifying that the established linkage withstands further 
empirical scrutiny from the perspective of causality. This empirical evidence has also 
been documented theoretically, as apparent from the historical background we relate 
below.  
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a 
historical perspective of African resistance. In Section 3, we discuss the construction of 
data on native resistance. Findings on correlations and causality are reported in Section 
4 and Section 5 respectively, while we lay out our conclusion in Section 6.  
 
2. Historical Background 
Between 1880 and 1935, the African continent experienced the onset of European 
colonialism resulting in the almost complete partition of the continent. According to 
Adu (1987ab), in 1880 only about 20% of Africa was occupied or controlled by the 
colonial powers or colonists. A glance at the map confirms this fact (Figure 1). 
However by 1914, with the exceptions of Liberia and Ethiopia, the entire African 
continent was under colonial influence as colonial powers had artificially divided the 
continent without recourse to cultural considerations. This division led to cultural 
damage of immense proportions. However, the conquest of Africa was not without 
resistance.  
 Adu (1987ab) decomposes colonial domination and reactions (resistant 
initiatives) from Africans into several phases. The first phase between 1880 and 1919 is 
characterised by confrontation in the light of defending sovereignty and independence.  
That phase in turn is divided into two sub-periods, namely: 1880-1890 and 1890-1919 
corresponding respectively to conquest and occupation.  The second phase for the 
period 1919-1935 is characterised by seeming adaptations by Africans which often 
disguised resistance and protesting strategies. The third phase starting roughly in 1935 
is the period of colonial independence movements characterised by concrete strategies 
and increasingly active resistance.  
 In spite of the different phases outlined above, it is important to note that even 
before the first phase (Crowder, 1968, p. 17 -19), contact between Africa and the 
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external world had already been established. In essence, slave trade was already present 
and the commercialisation of human beings was already creating substantial problems 
within Africa on the one hand and between Africans and Europeans on the other hand. 
Nonetheless, from the time of the first contacts in the mid-15
th
 century through 1880 the 
interactions may have been characterised as mainly commercial, as opposed to political, 
in nature with Africans retaining at least a modicum of political input even in those 
areas most directly impacted by European contact. 
 All of this changed dramatically; however, at the beginning of the first phase, 
when as an outgrowth of the continuing struggle for dominance among the European 
powers, Africa was distributed among those same powers during the Berlin Conference, 
between November 15
th
 1884 and November 26
th
 1885.  The Berlin Conference 
recognized and led to various types of arrangements for effectuating the partition; in 
some cases treaties concluded between Africans and Europeans (e.g. treaties signed 
between Imperial British East Africa Company and the Buganda) and in others, bilateral 
treaties concluded between Europeans (the Anglo-German treaty on the delimitation in 
1886). According to the narrative at the time, the partition of Africa was an eloquent 
testimony of capitalism and a display of the superiority of the ‘white race’ with 
overtones drawn from then popular theories such as social Darwinism and social 
Atavism.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Figure 1. Africa in 1880 on the eve of the partition  
 
Source:Adu Boahen (1987ab) 
In the field, the conquest was bloody and spectacular
3
. In 1902, the conquest of Africa 
was almost complete. It was a very bloody historical experience. The devastating 
firepower of the Maxim machine gun and the relative sophistication of European 
technology must have been a bitter experience for Africans. But though the conquest of 
Africa by Europe was relatively easy, occupation and the establishment of European 
administrations proved more delicate (Uzoigwe 1987, 65). The reason is simple: 
                                                          
3 For example, France is the country that was most apparent in this military occupation policy. The French defeated 
the damel Kajoor, Latjor, quilutta until his death in 1886. They overcame Mamadou Lamine at the Touba – Kouta 
battle, in 1887, thus ending the Soninke Empire that was founded in Senegambia. They also managed to break the 
stubborn resistance of the great and famous Samori Toure, captured in 1898 and exiled to Gabon in 1900. A series of 
victories by the French characterised this époque: Koudian in 1889, Segou in 1890 and Yuri in 1891 in which 
Commander Louis Archinard destroyed the Tukuloor Empire of Segou, although its leader Ahmadu continued with 
fierce resistance until his death in Sokoto in 1898. Elsewhere in West Africa, the French conquered Côte d’Ivoire and 
the future French Guinea, where they established colonies in 1893.The conquest of the Kingdom of Dahomey began 
in 1890 and ended in 1894. By the late 1890s, the French had conquered the whole of Gabon, consolidated their 
positions in North Africa, completed the conquest of Madagascar (they exiled Queen Ranavalona III in 1897 to 
Algiers) and  on the eastern border between the Sahara and the Sahel, ended the stubborn resistance of Rabah at 
Sennar, killed in action in 1900 (Uzoigwe, 1987, 56). England also followed the same route as the French. Other 
powers experienced a difficult occupation, particularly Italy. Her defeat in Adowa in 1896 substantiates this position.  
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Africans did not easily accept this domination. There has never really been a pax 
colonica (Ranger, 1987; Davidson, 1968, p 181 -183). 
Resistance was manifested practically in all regions of European penetration. 
But it had striking differences in intensity from one region to another. In Northern 
Rhodesia (now Zambia), there were armed resistance movements, but they did not offer 
anything comparable in magnitude to those that were held in Southern Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe), which furthermore from an organisational viewpoint cannot be compared 
to resistance movements against the Portuguese in the Zambezi valley (Ranger, 1987). 
In the same vein, Isaacman (1976, p. 343, 345, 370) argues that the revolt that 
was triggered in 1917 in the Zambezi valley was different from previous resistance 
movements, as it aimed at regaining independence of an important political system or a 
group of related people. The 1917 revolt was intended to release all Zambezi people 
under colonial oppression, particularly, oppressed peasants, whatever their ethnicity. 
“The evolution of primitive loyalty represented a new level of political consciousness, 
in which the Portuguese was seen for the first time as a common oppressor”. Beyond 
the content of these resistances, Ranger (1987) noted that the underlying resistance 
which was often driven by rational and innovative ideologies, with important 
consequences in their time still has significant contemporary resonance
4
. Authors 
sympathetic to the economic perspective allege that it is from the twentieth century that 
the real important movements of resistance to colonial rule were apparent (Ranger, 
1987). As we have earlier emphasised, all African regions were affected.  In North-East 
Africa, a major rebellion for instance was the Mahdist revolution of Sudan. In French 
West Africa European conquest and occupation reached their peak during the period 
1880-1900 (Gueye & Boahen, 1987, 137), strongly supported by military strategy. 
Resistance was also active. Samori Toure, Chief of Mandenopta Empire openly opted 
for confrontation rather than an alliance strategy.  Although he also used diplomacy, 
much emphasises was placed on armed resistance. In British West Africa, whereas the 
British occasionally favoured peaceful negotiations, some violent incidences were also 
apparent.
5
 
                                                          
4
Authors such as Samir Amin see things from an economic perspective. Here he describes the resistance movements 
which, while being directed against African aristocracy, were also a defence against French economic aggression. 
5In short, in this part of Africa, there were several uprisings or rebellions, inter alia: that of Mamadou Lamine in 
Senegal between 1885 and 1887 and those of  Fode  Kabba the wizard King of Kombo and Fode Kabba, the Muslim 
head of Niamina and district of Casamance in Gambia between 1898 and 1901; the rebellion caused in 1898 by taxes 
in Sierra Leone, led by Bai Bureh; that of Ashanti Gold Coast in 1900, under the direction of the Queen of Edweso 
8 
 
 In East Africa (Mwanzi, 1987) and Central Africa (Isaacman & Vansina, 
1987), problems of this nature were also apparent. Rodney (1987) admits that for at 
least three decades between 1880 and 1910, African resistance substantially helped to 
slow-down the progress of economic colonization. But European dominance continued 
in the second phase (Adu Boahen, 1987).
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Between 1919 and 1935, the nationalist sentiment grew. The colonial configuration 
could only accelerate this process. Thus the inequalities faced by educated Africans 
relative to their European peers of comparable education contributed to increasing the 
need for African emancipation. African elites were no longer satisfied with intermediary 
structures, especially for economic and efficiency reasons (Olatunji Oloruntimehin, 
1987). In West Africa, this period of African resistance to colonialism was characterized 
with the 1919 riots in Sierra Leone due to inter alia: frustration of the educated classes 
and African traders and unemployment in major cities. These riots were in fact violent 
and spontaneous protests against what they saw as injustices arising from the 
management of the colonial economy. Looting and disorder spread to Freetown in 
Moyamba, Kangahun (25-26 July 1919), Mano, Boia, Makump, Bo, Bonthe, Eat and 
Port Lokko. The situation was so serious that some troops were called-in from the Gold 
Coast. The situation in Central Africa is aptly documented by Davidson, Isaacman and 
Pelissier, (1987, 739). 
 
3. Native resistance data  
 The data on African resistance to colonial domination is from Frankema (2011, 
2012). Consistent with the author, the index is computed on a scale of 1 to 5 with high 
values representing a higher level of insecurity or resistance. Seen another way, 
insecurity is the result of the failure of the colonial powers to invest in suppressing 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Nana YaaAsantewaa; that of Ekumeku from 1898 to 1900 and the uprising of the Aro of 1898-1902 in Eastern 
Nigeria; the rebellion of Bariba Borgou and Atakora Somba of Dahomey between 1913 and 1914; those of Mosi in 
Koudougou and Fada N'Gourma Upper Volta from 1908 to 1909;  the uprising in Porto Novo in Dahomey and the 
revolts of Baulé of Akoussé, Sassandra and Guro in Ivory Coast between 1900 and 1914, and the plethora of 
uprisings that took place in several places of Guinea between 1908 and 1914. It is interesting to note that these 
rebellions redoubled intensity during the First World War (Ikime 1973; Afigbo 1973). 
6 Crowder (1987) pointed out that even during World War I, resistance was still apparent, especially in regions such 
as Southern French West Africa, Côte d’Ivoire, and much of Libya or Karamoja Uganda were characterised with 
many armed uprisings and other forms of protests. Reasons for these uprisings are documented in Crowder (1987, 
322-323). 
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resistance movements. The interval between the Berlin conferences (of 1884-1885) and 
the beginning of World War I is most important in determining this index.
7
 
Accordingly, the index is constructed based on the following criteria for colonies: (i) 
under full European control before 1885; (ii) brought under control during the period 
1885-1914 by treaties in the absence of notable armed struggles with the European 
colonial power(s); (iii)  pacified between 1885 and 1914 by employment of force with 
consequences of demographic nature; (iv) pacified between 1885 and 1914 with the 
employment of armed forces against resistant movements to European rule; and (v)  not 
entirely controlled prior to 1914 because of recurrent revolts and/or ongoing guerrilla 
warfare. Frankema’s resulting data corresponding to these categories is represented in 
Table 1. 
Table 1. Resistance index 
Countries 
Native 
resistance Countries 
Native 
resistance 
Angola 5 Mali 3 
Burundi 5 Mozambique 5 
Benin 3 Mauritania 3 
Burkina Faso 4 Mauritius 1 
Botswana 2 Malawi 3 
Central AfricanRepublic 5 Namibia 4 
Côte d’Ivoire 3 Niger 5 
Cameroon 3 Nigeria 3 
Congo 3 Rwanda 5 
Djibouti 2 Sudan 5 
Ethiopia 5 Senegal 3 
Gabon 3 Sierra Leone 3 
Ghana 3 Somalia 5 
Guinea 3 Sao Tome & Principe 1 
Gambia 3 Swaziland 1 
Guinea-Bissau 5 Chad 5 
Equatorial Guinea 2 Togo 2 
                                                          
7 As previously noted, the conference of Berlin marks the beginning of the conquest of the African continent on a 
massive scale. 
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Kenya 3 Tanzania 4 
Liberia 5 Democratic Republic of Congo 4 
Lesotho 1 Zambia 2 
Madagascar 3 Zimbabwe 3 
 
4. Basic OLS estimates 
We begin by presenting a linear regression or a baseline relationship between native 
resistance to colonial domination and development. From Figure 1, a negative 
relationship is apparent.  
Figure 1. Native Resistance and GDP per capita   
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 Following Nunn (2008), we improve the baseline results by accounting for other 
country characteristics though the regression equation given below: 
 
where is the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita in country in 2000. The data 
on GDP per capita for the year 2000 is obtained from Maddison (2003). Ci denotes the 
vector of dummy variables which show the origin of colonial powers before 
independence. These are included to account for the other relevant events during the 
continent’s colonial rule. Xi is a vector of control variables that are meant to control for 
cross-country differences in climate and geography. We also included used 
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ln(exportsi/areai) as an additional control to account for the total number of slaves 
exported during the period 1400-1900, after normalization with land area. Other control 
variables to capture the potential relevance of geography for economic development in 
the long-run are included, namely: (i) minimum monthly rainfall; (ii) average minimum 
temperature; distance from the equator; (iii) proximity to the ocean measured by the 
natural log of coastline divided by land area; (iv) longitude; and, (v) average maximum 
humidity. With the exception of longitude, all these factors do influence our results for a 
nation endowed with a tropical climate that affects agricultural productivity and subject 
to the prevalence of infectious diseases (Sachs et al., 2001). We also include longitude 
to account for variations between the western and eastern parts of Africa. The sources of 
the variables are provided in the Appendices.  
 Table 2 contains results of estimations that are consistent with Nunn (2008). In 
the first column, only variables based on colonial observations are reported. We 
consider the variable that captures resistance to colonialism and dummies of colonial 
identities. The variable of interest is negatively significant even after controlling for 
other indicators in the conditioning information set. The relationship is consistently 
negatively significant, though with decreased degrees of significance and magnitude. 
For example, an increase by one standard deviation in the level of resistance in the 
baseline regression is associated with about 1.9 percent decrease in GDP per capita. 
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Table 2. Main results 
 
I II III IV 
Native resistance -0.320*** -0.301** -0.192* -0.194* 
 
(0.095) (0.119) (0.110) (0.098) 
Distance fromequator 
 
-0.480 -0.851 -0.990* 
  
(0.599) (0.622) (0.539) 
Longitude 
 
0.010 0.003 0.005 
  
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Lowestmonthlyrainfall 
 
0.019 0.017 -0.004 
  
(0.031) (0.034) (0.035) 
Avg max humidity 
 
-0.005 -0.011 -0.007 
  
(0.014) (0.017) (0.017) 
Avg min temperature 
 
-0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
  
(0.009) (0.013) (0.009) 
ln(coastline/area) 
 
-0.052 -0.089 -0.095 
  
(0.078) (0.082) (0.076) 
Percent  islam 
  
-0.003 0.001 
   
(0.004) (0.001) 
UK legalorigin 
  
-1.146 -1.196 
   
 (0.830) 
ln(gold prod/pop) 
   
0.008 
    
(0.018) 
ln(oilprod/pop) 
   
0.064* 
    
(0.032) 
ln(diamondprod/pop) 
   
0.035 
    
(0.075) 
Colonizerfixed effets Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 42 42 42 42 
R
2
 0.248 0.339 0.369 0.5794 
Joint signific. of resistence(p) 0.002 0.017 0.093 0.058 
Sqr. Partial Correlation 0.2238 0.1306 0.0385 0.0376 
Sum of Sqr. Partial 
Correlations (colonized fixed 
effect) 0.3411 0.2930 0.3078 0.2443 
Notes. OLS estimates of (1) are reported. The colonizer fixed effects are indicator variables for the 
identity of the colonizer at the time of independence. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in 
brackets. All regions contain a constant term0.01 - ***; 0.05 - **; 0.1 - *.  
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In Table 3, we replicate the estimations of the last column of Table 2 with emphasis on 
extreme observations. The two estimation techniques employed are Least Trimmed 
Squares and the S-Estimator. Box-transformation, or transformation of the resistance 
variable, is also employed. We notice that the variable of interest remains consistently 
significant with the same negative sign, but with an improved coefficient. Hence, we 
conclude that native resistance is negatively linked to contemporary African economic 
development.  
 
Table 3.—Robustness with Respect to Influential Observations 
 
Least 
trimmed 
squares 
Box-Cox 
Transformation 
of Native 
resistance 
S-
Estimator 
Native resistance -0.420*** -0.152*** -0.126*** 
 
(0.033) (0.080) (0.034) 
Constant  13.311*** 10.291*** 10.794*** 
 
(0.239) (1.0464) (0.239) 
Number of observations 42 42 42 
Notes. OLS estimates of (1) are reported. The colonizer fixed effects are indicator variables for the 
identity of the colonizer at the time of independence. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in 
brackets. All regions contain constant and reproduce control variables in the last column of Table 2. 
0.01 - ***; 0.05 - **; 0.1 - *.  
 
 
5. Possible channels of causality  
How is the relationship established by the correlations in the preceding section reflected 
in contemporary economic development in Africa? Following Nunn (2008), and without 
pretending to be exhaustive, we present a preliminary and exploratory analysis of 
possible mechanisms.  
 The first channel via which ‘native resistance’ affects contemporary 
development is Gross Public Revenue per capita. For example, in 1898, chiefs 
associated with Mende in Sierra Leone, revolted under the leadership of one and 
unanimously decided not to pay the tax, Bai Bureh. The rebellion resulted from the 
promulgation by the British government of the 1896 Protectorate Ordinance which 
established direct British governance and imposed a taxation regime of 5 shillings for 
two-room houses and 10 shillings for larger houses annually. 
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 Besley and Persson (2013) have established the link between taxation (or public 
source of income) and development. Figure 2 shows a negative relationship between the 
degree of resistance and public income
8
.This implies that the state apparatus did not 
mobilise sufficient financial resources to offset the costs of administering the various 
colonies, seemingly because native resistance increased with the growth of colonial 
administrators and implicitly taxation (see Figure 3).  
 According to Huillery (2014), the colonisation of Western Africa by France was 
not costly to the French tax payer. This elucidates why there was little public investment 
by France in the sub-region during the colonial era. In essence, public finance to run the 
French colonies came from taxation of the African inhabitants. In other words, it is 
reasonable to infer that greater mobilisation of financial resources would have led to 
more public investments, but active or passive resistance by African populations sapped 
the resources of colonial governments delaying or preventing increased investment in 
public infrastructure or services (Figure 2).
9
 Conversely, regions where there was less 
resistance to colonial rule benefited from more colonial public investment and enjoy 
high schooling rates, more household goods and better public services such as health 
care 
 
Figure 2: Fiscal income per capita vs Native resistance 
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8The data is obtained from Frankema and van Waijenburg (2013). 
9This conclusion elicits another link between native resistance and development. In essence, the provision of public 
services is a function of mobilised resources and when the allocation of resources is inefficient, inequality naturally 
results. At least one contemporary study has found that in turn inequality negatively affects development (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016ab).  
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 Another mechanism through which African resistance could impact 
contemporary development is in terms of human capital. Bolt and Bezemer (2009) have 
established that accumulated human capital during the colonial era is a robust predictor 
of contemporary African development. Meanwhile, Frankema (2011, 2012) find a 
highly negative nexus between the levels native resistance and human capital 
accumulation. By this mechanism, it can be reasonably inferred that there is a 
relationship between contemporary development and the degree of colonial resistance in 
the past.  
6. Conclusion  
Nunn (2009) posited history is important for development and/or influences the 
development of nations. This study has arrived at a similar conclusion by focusing on 
the relationship between African native resistance and European colonial domination. 
We have established that African resistance to colonial domination has had an impact 
on the continent’s contemporary development. Generally speaking resistance has had 
negative repercussions in terms of contemporary economic development. This 
relationship is robust to the control of outliers and extreme values. We have also 
discussed possible channels of causality between native resistance and contemporary 
African economic development.  
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Appendices  
 
Data  
 
Real GDP per capita data is obtained from Maddison (2003).   
Land area which is employed to compute ln (coastline/area), ln (export/area) and 
population density around the year 1400, is measured in millions of kilometres 
square (see Parker, 1997).  
Distance from the equator is measured as the absolute value of the latitude 
corresponding to each country’s centroid, appreciated in degrees.  
Longitude represents the longitude of the centroid of each country which is also 
measured in degrees. The computation of each country’s centroid is done 
employing the Centroid Utility in ArcGIS.  In five countries where the centroid is 
not within national borders (Cape Verde, Gambia, Mauritius, Seychelles and 
Somalia), the closest to the centroid within the country is used.  
 
Location on the coast is that which is nearest to centroid of each country as identified 
using the Proximity Utility in ArcGIS.  
Lowest rainfall on a monthly basis represents the average rainfall which is measured in 
driest month of the year in terms of millimeters.  
Average maximum humidity represents the average of the maximum afternoon 
humidity that is measured during the hottest month of the year in percentage 
terms.  
Average minimum temperature refers to the lowest average temperature in a month, 
measured in terms of degrees Celsius. As reported in Parker (1997), the data are 
from meteorological observations that are collected over a period of 30 years.  
Total coastline of countries is also from Parker (1997). It is used with land area to 
compute ln (coastline/area), which is also measured in thousands of kilometers.  
Percent Islamic indicator refers to the percentage of the Islamic population of a 
country (see Parker, 1997).   
Legal origins is obtained from La Porta et al. (1999). All nations in the sample are 
coded as French civil or British common law countries.   
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Production of mined gold, crude petroleum and diamonds are from the British 
Geological Survey’s World Mineral Statistics and World Mineral Production. All 
the three indicators are computed as the natural logarithm of the mean annual per 
capita production during the period 1970-2000. Diamonds which consist of both 
industrial diamonds and gemstones are measured in thousands of carats; mined 
gold is measured in kilograms while Crude petroleum is computed in thousands of 
tones.  
